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In the name of food security for the nation and poverty
alleviation for the rural population, every developing
country provides its farmers with irrigation water at a
fraction of its delivery cost. However, the realization
that fresh water is scarce and getting scarcer has forced
a widespread rethinking of this “cheap water” policy. A
farmer who pays next to nothing for water has no
incentive to use it efficiently. He uses it to grow lowvalue field crops, irrigates carelessly using flood and
furrow methods, does not repair his field channels, and
over-waters his standing crop.

some land fallow. She can cultivate all her land but
stress her crop a little, thus maximizing her output per
unit of water rather than her output per unit of land. She
can diversify out of thirsty but low-value field and
fodder crops into low-water-using but lucrative fruit
trees and vegetables. And finally, she can invest in
efficient irrigation technologies, such as sprinkler and
drip systems, which allow a larger fraction of diverted
water to be used consumptively by the plant. Even a
simple change such as shortening the length of the
irrigation furrow could raise field-level irrigation
efficiencies by up to ten percent. There is evidence from
theoretical and mathematical programming models that
farmers do respond to price-induced water scarcity in all
of these ways.

It is therefore argued, in developing and developed
countries alike, that the price of irrigation water should
be raised to reflect its scarcity value. This policy is now
under consideration in Morocco, China, and in parts of
India.1 Alternatively, farmers should be allowed to sell
their water shares to higher value uses both within and
without the agricultural sector. Such trades would be
economically efficient and in the farmer’s interest.
Tradable water rights have been implemented in Chile,
and to a lesser extent in Mexico. In short, water is an
economic good and not a birthright, and wasteful water
use can best be combated by “getting the prices right.”

Much of the recent literature on water prices and water
markets is from the agriculturally rich, but water-short,
western United States (US). Using agronomically
derived production functions for cotton, Ayer and Hoyt
(1981) find that farmers in Arizona reduce the water
applied as its price rises from $0.5 per acre-foot to $5
per acre-foot. Using Census of Agriculture data for
several crops, Ogg and Gollehon (1989) derive
downward sloping, albeit rather price-inelastic, demand
functions for irrigation water. Caswell and Zilberman
(1985) show that the probability of adopting drip
irrigation technologies for perennial tree crops increases
with increased water prices, amongst other factors.2 In a
modeling exercise, Weinberg, Kling, and Wilen (1993)
show that as water prices offered to the farmer rose
from zero to $50 an acre-foot, water-intensive crops
were no longer optimal, and irrigation water applied
fell.

In this paper, I examine the hypothesis that in order to
induce efficiency at the farm level, water prices should
be raised or water trades should be facilitated. In the
first section, I lay out the rationale for opportunity-cost
water pricing, citing modeling, and empirical evidence
in its favor. In Section two I bring out the (often
implicit) assumptions under which market-like forces
can in fact increase irrigation efficiency. In Section
three, drawing on a case study from the Mula Canal in
western India, I argue that these assumptions do not
hold on existing canal systems in many developing
countries. Therefore, water prices (or tradable water
rights) are not the best way to save water or increase its
productivity. Transparent and enforceable allocation
rules may be more feasible, and output price policy
changes more effective, at least in the near term.

It should be noted that in most of these studies on water
prices, the response of water use is rather low within the
observed price ranges. Only when the price is projected
to rise significantly by a factor of five, ten, or
sometimes more, is the water demand price responsive.3 The consensus appears to be that the water
demand curve for agriculture is inelastic at low water
prices. The elasticity is high when water prices are
already high, and when water is more a substitute for,
than a complement to, other inputs. I shall revisit this
point later in the paper.

OPPORTUNITY-COST PRICING: THE
RATIONALE AND THE EVIDENCE
If water prices rise to reflect its opportunity cost, a
rational farmer should have any or all of four responses
(Gardner, 1983). She can demand less water and leave
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In the developing country context, informal, intrawatercourse trading is active on north Indian and
Pakistani canals (Bandaragoda, 1998). Such sales are
generally illegal, but they occur nevertheless. Shortterm sales of ground water and of water directly
pumped from canals are quite common.

costs and potential losses will overcome the
benefits of trade or local water savings.
The last two items relate to the difficulties of
implementing higher water prices or tradable water
rights, and they have borne the brunt of the criticisms
leveled at water markets. Many reservations exist about
the inadequate physical infrastructure of canal systems
in developing countries, the administrative cost of
introducing volumetric pricing (Perry, 1996), the
difficulty of measuring water consumed rather than
water diverted, and the possible third party effects of
trade (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994). Such
reservations are entirely justified, but I shall focus on
assumptions 1, 2, and 4. These assumptions do not
relate to implementation, but rather to the effectiveness
of price incentives per se.

Tradable water rights refer to longer-term commitments
for an entire growing season or more. The most
celebrated case of tradable water rights comes from
Chile, where agrarian reforms and the Water Code of
1981 formalized water rights, and allowed water sales
separately from sales of land. These reforms have led to
more land under high-valued fruits and vegetables, less
land under pasture, and a greater than 20 percent
increase in water use efficiency in Chilean agriculture
(Rosegrant, Gazmuri & Yadav, 1995). The Chilean case
has been cited as a model for other developing
countries.4

I examine an Indian canal system – the Mula Canal in
Maharashtra – to ask: How effective are higher water
prices, either imposed on or offered to the farmer, as a
means of curtailing his water demand, even if
transaction and infrastructure costs are not
constraining? I analyze whether higher water charges
are the most feasible way to induce farm level
efficiency; whether farm level efficiency is indeed as
dismal as it is generally thought to be; and whether
water prices are the most relevant prices in a farmer’s
cropping decisions.

THE ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND “GETTING
PRICES RIGHT”
The claim that “getting prices right” is an effective
means to irrigation efficiency is much more than a
generic statement about downward-sloping demand
curves. It is based on many assumptions:
1. Water prices are significant in the overall crop
budget, and as a fraction of crop net revenues. If
not, the income effect of price increases may be so
small that the water demand will barely respond.5
2. There is a volumetric link between what a farmer
pays and what he receives. If water is charged by
the hectare, as it usually is in developing countries,
its marginal cost is zero and higher prices cannot
induce efficiency.6
3. Farm level inefficiencies are significant in relation
to overall system inefficiencies. If not, the farm
level may not be the place in which to look for
water savings.
4. Farmers do not diversify into high-value crops and
irrigate using wasteful methods because water is so
cheap. If low-valued crops are grown for other
reasons, e.g. for own consumption, or because
farmers face labor constraints, price signals may
not have the expected effect.
5. The changes to the physical infrastructure that are
necessary to implement water trades or volumetric
pricing, such as measuring devices, channels for
conveyance, etc., are not prohibitively expensive. If
they are, any gains from trade will be neutralized
by these implementation costs.7
6. Tradable water rights can be allocated and enforced
without high transaction costs; and third party
effects, if significant, can be countered. If not, these

The data and modeling results I report below are from
my own fieldwork on the Mula, carried out over eight
months in 1991-1992. These results are more relevant
for the analysis of water prices than of tradable water
rights, because so little is known about how such rights
might work in this region.
FARMER INCENTIVES ON THE MULA CANAL
The Mula Canal System in western India has an
irrigable command area of 80,000 hectares. The primary
crops are sugarcane (a thirsty, lucrative cash crop),
sorghum, wheat, chickpeas, and groundnuts. Of late,
sunflowers have grown in popularity. The Mula is a
“typical” Asian canal in that the water supply is better at
the head of the system than at the tail; water often does
not reach the fields on time; and the farmers pay a
(small) per hectare charge for the water they receive.
This charge varies by the crop and the season, so there
is some attempt to link water charges and volumes. The
command area has several shallow wells, which
supplement canal water supplies. The water from these
wells is also cheap, because electricity is subsidized.
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Water Prices and Irrigation Efficiency

to higher water prices – fallowing land, switching crops,
etc. – are a result of lowering her water use. Rationing
would directly force her into a lower, and presumably
more efficient, water use pattern. By comparing the
farmer’s crop choices under low prices with rationing,
and under successively higher water prices without
rationing, we can see at what point the farm level
irrigation demands are comparable. We can also
estimate the net returns per unit of water applied in
various water price and crop choice scenarios.

Canal water prices are heavily subsidized for the
farmers on the Mula – so much so that water costs are
insignificant in relation to the crops’ per acre revenues.
For example, water costs for sunflowers are 0.77
percent of its (average) net profits per acre; for winter
wheat this figure is 0.59 percent; for summer
groundnuts 1 percent; and for sugarcane 1.12 percent.
All the (previously cited) evidence on price elasticities
suggests that water demand will not respond to price
increases when the base price of water is so low. In
addition, the existing system of per acre water prices
means that the marginal cost of water is zero for each
crop. It is true that higher water fees for low-value or
water-consuming crops might induce a farmer to switch
over to less water-intensive crops. However, it is clear
that prices would have to be raised by several hundred
percent before water costs reach even 5 percent of a
crop’s net revenues.

Using cost-of-cultivation data from the upper-middle
reaches of the Mula Canal, and a mathematical
programming model written in GAMS, a median-sized
farmer’s profits were computed under different water
prices. Figure 1 plots the net profits per acre-inch of
water applied (Y-axis) against the price of canal water
for sugarcane (X-axis).8 Sugarcane is the crop with the
highest water price and the highest water requirement.
Agronomic and crop-cutting experiments show that
sugarcane has low returns per unit of water used, but
high returns per unit of land (Rath and Mitra, 1989).
Therefore a water-efficient cropping pattern would have
less sugarcane and more seasonal crops such as wheat
or sunflowers.

An alternative proposal would be physically to ration
the water given to agriculture and to each irrigated acre.
Recall that all the ways in which a farmer could respond

Figure 1. Water prices for sugarcane v. net returns to water applied
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The model solution shows that when a farmer’s water is
rationed according to simple, proportional allocation
rules, a four-acre plot would have 1.4 acres of sugarcane
(for 12 months); and a winter-summer cycle of
sunflowers followed by groundnuts on her remaining
land. If she can buy all the extra water she wants over
and above that allocation, she grows four acres of
sugarcane at a price of Rs 50/acre-inch,9 less and less
cane as prices rise sharply, and finally replicates the
rationing crop pattern at a price of Rs 300/acre-inch. At
this point, the net returns to water are high and
comparable to those under rationing. A six-fold water
price increase was needed to induce this waterconserving response.

farmers towards the tail end of the canal may accept
lower prices, where water supplies are already uncertain
and only low-value crops can be supported.
Main System Management and Irrigation Efficiency
If water prices or water trades are expected to improve
irrigation efficiencies, it seems reasonable to ask how
inefficient water use at the farm level really is, and what
the relationship is between water prices, main system
management, and these inefficiencies.
Farmers on the Mula Canal do flood irrigate their
sugarcane fields, and they do allow water to spill
beyond their irrigation furrows. But it is now well
understood that these seepage and runoff “losses” are
not necessarily lost to the basin. Wells in the command
are recharged by seeped water, and return flows have
instream uses or can be diverted again lower down. The
water “saved” in one part of the system, through
incentives or other means, may not be a net saving at all
(Seckler, 1996). Of course, some return flows become
saline and unusable. On the other hand, water which
recharges a well over which the farmer has complete
control, and which can be used between canal
deliveries, has a very high marginal value. In the Mula
command, well water in the parched month of May had
a marginal value equal to 1/12 of the profits on an acre
of groundnuts (Ray, 1997).

For the near future, such severe water price hikes are
unlikely to be suggested, let alone implemented.
Farmers are numerous, and they vote. They object
vociferously even to small price increases in water or
electricity (Economist, 1997).10 Nor would the urban
population support significant price increases, out of
fear that their food costs would rise, or that national
food security would be compromised. In sum,
significant price increases are politically infeasible, and
feasible price increases are economically insignificant.11
The net returns to water shown in Figure 1 give an
(admittedly crude) indication of the price that farmers
would have to be offered to sell a part of their water
allotments. The average value of an acre-inch of water
ranges between Rs 100 and Rs 175 (see Figure 1).12 At
any price above its average value, the farmer could
consider selling some water and growing a little less
cane. In fact, the offer price would have to be even
higher because a farmer who gives up water loses the
insurance that this water provides in the event of a
drought, or a sudden shortfall.13 There are no studies to
show how much water would be demanded at these
prices, but Rs 100 an acre-inch is already a higher rate
than is paid by municipalities and cane-crushing
factories within the Mula command area. 14 However,

Winter irrigation #
1
2
3
4
5
6

Even if it is assumed that most of the seepage and
runoff are irretrievably lost, a sizable fraction of these
losses does not occur at the field level. Cumulative
measurements of conveyance, evaporation, and other
losses on the Mula Canal were as follows: From the
reservoir to the distributaries, 38 percent; from these to
the minor branches, 42 percent; from the minors to the
field channels, 75 percent (WALMI, 1984). That is, the
farmer can be given “incentives” to be efficient with
only 25 percent of the irrigation water diverted from the
reservoir. This is all the water that he has control over.

Interval (in days)
Not applicable
18
26
31
27
24

Summer irrigation #
1
2
3
4
5

Table 1. Irrigation delivery intervals on the Mula Canal, 1989/1990
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Interval (in days)
Not applicable
20
18
24
34

These “loss” figures are for the canal overall – they
would be lower upstream and higher downstream. 15 In
addition to lower volumes delivered, farmers along the
bottom third of the canal have unpredictable water
supplies. Planned and actual deliveries are further and
further apart as they proceed down the canal, and
farmers openly admit that they take extra water when it
finally arrives. They are also forced into low-valued,
water stress-tolerant field crops, because they do not
know when next to expect water. For example, water
from the Mula Canal is supposed to arrive at 21 day
intervals for the winter crop season, and 14 days apart in
the summer. The table below shows the actual delivery
intervals for one watercourse in 1989-90. This was not
even a tail-end watercourse.

have only a small impact on overall water use
efficiency.
Output Prices and Irrigation Efficiency
On the Mula Canal, sugarcane is the cash crop of choice
for both large and small landholders. The cane-crushing
mills, which are given a subsidy per ton of cane
processed, guarantee a high support price to sugarcane
producers. In 1991, the farm-gate price reported from
this area was Rs 35 per quintal. (By 1996, this figure
had risen to Rs 39). The procurement price guaranteed
by the state of Maharashtra was Rs 29 per quintal. The
average producer’s cost was just above Rs 22.
Sugarcane is popular for its high and certain returns to
land (the cane-crushing factories pay farmers more than
the government support price), for its resistance to pests,
and its low labor requirements compared to waterefficient crops such as vegetables, oilseeds, or spices.
The programming model of the representative farm was
run again, this time keeping the water price low, but
parametrically varying the price of sugarcane. The
model solution shows that had the government not
supported the price of cane, or subsidized the canecrushing facilities, it would have been unprofitable for
the farmers to grow sugarcane (Fig. 2). When sugarcane
prices (plotted on the X-axis) fall, the acreage of cane
(on the primary Y-axis) drops sharply. At cane prices
of Rs 25 or less, even at low water prices farmers switch
completely to a more water-conserving cycle of
sunflowers followed by groundnuts (Ray, 1997).

Finally, water fee collections on the Mula, as on most
Indian canals, is poor. The Irrigation Department’s own
(unpublished) records show that from 1977 to 1990
collections ranged from 15 percent of the expected
annual total to a high of 64 percent. Had the uncollected
balances been rolled over from year to year, these
percentages would have been very much smaller.16
To what extent farm level inefficiencies, which certainly
exist, are themselves a response to main system
inefficiencies is a very important question (Wade and
Chambers, 1980). Water prices can only affect that
water over which the farmers have some control, and
those inefficiencies, which are caused by low water
prices. In the present situation, higher prices (if
collected!) are likely to lower farmers’ net revenues, but
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Figure 2. Optimal sugarcane acres and annual water use on a 4-acre farm; varying cane prices; low water
prices

Maharashtra produces about 14 percent of India’s
sugarcane (by cane weight). If the government did
attempt to remove its support price, it would find a
powerful, well-organized and hostile opponent in the
cane-processing lobby (Attwood, 1985). Sugarcane
growing farmers, too, would be up in arms. As I have
earlier argued, drastic rises in water prices also appear
politically impossible. But if we want to use price policy
to reduce the demand for irrigation or to induce efficient
crop diversification, output rather than water prices
appear to be a more direct route.

their staff members to operate efficiently are at least as
urgently needed as those for farmers.
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END NOTES

1

7

Water policy analysts in India are debating higher
water prices as a way to recover the operating and
maintenance costs of major canal systems. This is quite
different from prices as an incentive to irrigate
efficiently. It is quite possible to raise prices to the point
where administrative costs are covered, and still have
them be lower than the opportunity cost of water.
Similarly, farm-level efficiency-inducing water trades
can co-exist with massive subsidies at the system level.
2
Field studies can measure only water diverted, not
water consumed. Therefore the production functions
used in such research could overstate or understate the
yield response to water applied.
3
Programming models, which are not restricted to
observed price ranges, are more likely to yield elastic
water – demand estimates. Including a demand function
for the crop itself should also generate higher elasticities
(Howitt, Watson and Adams, 1980).
4
It should, however, be noted that both land and water
rights in Chile were regularized over a relatively short
period (see Bauer, 1997). It is not obvious from the
literature to what extent the Water Code should be given
credit for the subsequent gains in productivity.
5
The substitution effect could be high, in which case the
own-price demand for water could be elastic even at
low prices.
6
This assumption also implies that that the system
should not physically ration the water as well as charge
higher prices. If it does, this physical limit rather than
the price is the relevant constraint (Perry, 1998).

It does not matter for the analysis whether these costs
are paid by the farmers, the government, or both.
8
For modeling purposes, I have converted the per acre
charges to per acre-inch equivalents. Without this
volumetric charge assumption, the model solution
would not respond to varying prices. Only canal water
prices have been varied, although the farmers irrigate
conjunctively with water from shallow dugwells.
9
In 1992, US $1 = Rs 30 approximately. Rs 50 is
slightly higher than the canal water price for sugarcane
during the hot weather season (in 1991).
10
I raised the issue of higher water prices (for cost
recovery reasons) at the Command Area Development
Authority for the Mula. The response of the Chief
Engineer was brief: “Are you mad?”
11
This situation is not unique to India. It is true of most
agriculture-based economies. Recent work on the Gediz
Canal in Turkey (Ray and Gdl, 1999), and the Zayandeh
Rud Basin in Iran (Perry, 1998) had strikingly similar
findings.
12
Marginal values of water in agriculture vary sharply
from month to month, or even week to week. Therefore
this comparison is best made with average values.
13
As an added complication, if water is sold separately
from the land, the land could lose value. The value of
irrigation water is frequently capitalized into the value
of the attached land.
14
Non-irrigation withdrawals from the Mula reservoir
amount to 7 percent of the irrigation withdrawals.
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15

In particular, “other” upstream losses include illegal
water diversions, mostly for unauthorized sugarcane or
irrigation outside the sanctioned command area. Illegal
irrigation is not a loss, but, if it goes unchecked, it
cannot be made efficient through higher water prices
(Ray and Williams, 1999).
16
In 1991, new water rates were proposed for the state
of Maharashtra. They were somewhat higher than the
existing rates, and the farmers on the Mula were
unhappy with the proposal. When I mentioned this to
the Sub-Divisional Officer with whom I worked, he was
astonished. “Why are they angry?” he wanted to know.
“They don’t pay us anyway.”
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